






































































Turkey’s EU  accession negotiations, which have proceeded  at  a  snail’s pace  since  they 
started  in October 2005, run  the risk of grinding  to a complete halt. The country, which 
has been nearly five decades waiting in Europe’s ante‐room (it became an associate EEC 
member  in 1963), has only opened 13 of the 35  ‘chapters’ or areas of EU  law and policy 
needed  to  complete  the  process.  It  has  closed  just  one  of  them  (science  and  research). 
About 18 chapters (the key ones) are blocked or frozen by the EU as a whole, by France or 










by Cyprus. The Spanish EU Presidency  in  the  first half of 2010 had hoped  to open  four 
chapters, but only opened one (food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy) and then 
on the very last day of its Presidency, while the Belgian EU Presidency achieved nothing 
in  this  field  in  the  second  half  of  last  year.  It  is  hoped  that  the  current  Hungarian 
Presidency will open one (competition policy). That leaves just two chapters, one of which 
is  on public procurement,  but Ankara does not  see why  it  should  open  its potentially 




to extend  its customs union with  the EU  (in effect since 1996) and allow Greek‐Cypriot 
vessels access  to  its ports and airports,  thereby recognising  the state of Cyprus. Ankara 
will not budge until  the European Council  (EC)  fulfils  its promise  to ease  the economic 
isolation  of  the  internationally‐unrecognised  Turkish  Republic  of  Northern  Cyprus 
(TRNC). All of Cyprus joined the EU in 2004, but the acquis communautaire only applies to 
the Greek‐Cypriot southern part of the  island. This  is because the northern part (36% of 
the territory) has been occupied by Turkey since  its military  intervention  in 1974 (under 
the 1960 treaty of guarantee which gave it the right to take action, though not to stay there 
indefinitely),  following  inter‐communal  strife between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and 
an  attempt  to  incorporate  the  island  into Greece  through  a  coup. After  the April  2004 
referendum in which Turkish Cypriots voted overwhelmingly ‘yes’ for the Annan Plan to 
reunify Cyprus  (Greek Cypriots massively  rejected  it),  the EC promised  to alleviate  the 
TRNC’s economic seclusion. The first action of a divided Cyprus as an EU member since 




five  chapters  (there  are  overlaps)  related  to  economic  and  monetary  union,  on  the 
grounds that this opens the door to full EU membership. Candidate status gives Turkey 
every right to expect full membership if it closes all the chapters, as has been the case for 





As  a  result  of  all  these  developments,  Turkey’s  support  for  EU  membership  has 
unsurprisingly plummeted since 2004 as more and more people feel that the negotiations 
are not proceeding on an equal footing (see Figure 1). The Turkish intelligentsia, at least, 
has not  forgotten  the words of  the European Council President Herman Van Rompuy, 
when in 2004 he declared, then as the Belgian Prime Minister, that Turkey ‘is not part of 
Europe and never will be’.2  In a similar vein,  Joseph Ratzinger, before he became Pope 










  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
Turkey  73  63  54  40  42  48  41 
US  43  37  35  40  32  41  38 




The new  focus on  the Middle East  is enjoying  increasing support among Turks, having 














a  whole  seems  to  be  to  do  the  minimum  to  keep  Turkey  on  board  in  the  accession 





The  arguments  for  letting  the  country  into  the  EU  if  it  fulfils  the  conditions  are well 
known  and  regularly  trotted  out  by  Ankara’s  supporters,  particularly  the  UK,  Spain, 
Sweden and Italy. The well‐reasoned reports of the Independent Commission, headed by 
the  former  Finnish  President  and  Nobel  laureate  Martti  Ahtisaari,  and  the  Reflection 
Group,  led  by  the  former  Spanish  Prime Minister  Felipe González,  both  in  favour  of 
















Minister David Cameron  regards  Turkey  as  the  BRIC  (Brazil, Russia,  India, China)  of 
Europe. With an annual average real GDP growth rate of close to 6% between 2003 and 
2010,  Turkey  is  the  fastest‐growing G20  economy  after  China  and  is  slated  to  be  the 
second‐largest economy in Europe by 2050. It is currently the 16th largest economy in the 













Over  the  last  30  years,  Turkey  has  become  a much more  open  economy.  Exports  and 
imports of goods and services rose from 17% of GDP in 1980 to 52.3% in 2008, although 




  1980  1990  2000  2008 
Turkey  17.1  31.0  43.2  52.3 
Euro area  52.8  54.7  72.9  80.1 
Middle‐income countries  32.5  39.3  52.8  59.7 
Source: World Bank, Quick Query Data Source. 
 
The EU  is by  far Turkey’s most  important  trade partner and  supplies more  than  three‐
quarters of  the country’s  foreign direct  investment  (FDI). Turkey has great potential  for 
European  business,  with  its  young  and  fast‐growing  market  (half  of  the  75  million 
population is under the age of 29), its proved base for high‐quality manufacturing and its 
companies  familiar with  a wide  and developing  region of which Turkey  is  a principal 
commercial hub. 
 
The  strong  growth  in  FDI  is  testimony  to Turkey’s  attractiveness.  For decades Turkey 
received no more  than US$1 billion of FDI  a year. As  a  result of  the decision  taken  in 
December 2004  to open accession negotiations  in October 2005,  this changed  in one  fell 
swoop. FDI in 2005 surged to US$10 billion and reached US$22 billion in 2007 (see Figure 









  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
FDI flows  1.7  2.8  10.0  20.0  22.0  18.1  7.6 




Spain  is  among  those  countries whose  corporate  sector  is  positioning  itself  in  Turkey. 
BBVA, Spain’s second‐largest bank, acquired 24.9% of Turkey’s Garanti Bank in 2010 and 
may  take  full  control  of  it  in  five years. Garanti  is part  of  the Dogus Group, Turkey’s 
third‐largest conglomerate. 
 
Turkey’s population  currently  represents around 15% of  the EU‐27’s population of 500 
million, while  its GDP accounts  for  just over 4% of  the Union’s  total. On  this basis,  the 




develops  over  the  next  two  decades.  Even  if  all  the  blocked  chapters were  unblocked 
overnight, it is most unlikely that Turkey would  join the EU until sometime in the 2020s 
and by  then  the Turkish economy,  if  the current stellar performance  is kept up  (by  the 
withering  standards  of  Europe  as  a  whole),  could  very  well  be  in  a  much  stronger 





Turkey  is  set  to play  a major  role  in  the EU’s  future  energy  needs  and diversification 








Turkey  itself has no oil or natural gas of  its own, but  it  is  ideally placed as an energy 
corridor between Central Asia and Europe.4 EU countries obtain oil from a large number 







of  sources,  but  in  the  case  of  natural  gas  there  is  a  very  high  level  of dependency  on 
Russia. This  is neither politically wise or economically advantageous, particularly  in the 
case of authoritarian Russia. When Moscow turned off the gas to Ukraine in 2006 it sent 





in Turkey and  seven planned  (see Figures 5 and 6). The 3,300km Nabucco pipeline,  in 
particular, is of crucial importance as it is designed to bring gas from Central Asia, one of 
the world’s richest gas regions,  to Austria via Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary. 
The pipeline  is  aimed  at meeting  5%  to  10%  of European  gas  requirements  as well  as 
functioning as an alternative supply  route  that would end  the complete dependency of 










669  km  on  Turkish  territory,  including 













BOTAS  operates  the  Turkish  section. 
Turkey is the consumer. 
Blue Stream gas pipeline 
1,213km,  links  Russia  and  Turkey 




sub‐sea  section  belongs  to  a  consortium 
between  Gazprom  and  Italy’s  ENI. 




296km  long,  operational  since 
November  2007.  Annual  capacity:  7 
bcm (currently working at 0.7). 




970km  long,  operational  since  1976. 
Daily capacity:1.6 million barrels. 
Turkey  hosts  Iraq’s  largest  crude  oil 
export line. 
Western gas pipeline 
842km  long,  operational  since  1988. 
Brings Russian gas to Turkey shipped 
through Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova 

















agreement  signed  by  Austria, 
Hungary,  Romania,  Bulgaria  and 
Turkey  in  July  2009.  Capacity:  30 
bcm. 





900km  long,  linking  the  Russian 
terminal  of  Dzhugba  with  Varna  in 
Bulgaria  and  then  crossing  through 
Greece  into  Italy and  through Serbia 
and  Hungary  into  Austria.  Annual 
capacity: 63 bcm 
In  November  2009,  Turkey  signed  an 
agreement  with  Russia  allowing  the 




807km  long,  to  extend  ITG  from 
Komofini to Otranto and raise annual 
capacity to 11 bcm. 








between Turkey,  Italy  and Russia  in 
October 2009. 
To  relieve  traffic  through  the Straits and 
upgrade the Ceyhan terminal, alternative 
to  the  Burgas‐Alexandroupolis  project. 
The  shares  in  the  project  company  are 
still to be decided. 
Trans‐Adriatic Pipeline  
520km  long,  to  connect  Thessaloniki 
with  Brindisi  through  Albania. 
Annual capacity: 10 bcm. 
To  be  supplied  by  Iranian  and 





and  Kazakh  gas  to  BTE,  possibly 
Nabucco. Annual capacity: 30 bcm. 
Advances  Turkey’s  role  as  a  transit 
country. 
Iraq‐Turkey gas pipeline 







Russian territory. Construction  is due to start  in 2012, with the first gas flowing  in 2015. 
When operating at  full capacity, Nabucco would  transport 1,550 bcm  to Europe over 50 
years. This means  that an economy  the  size of Germany  could be  supplied  solely with 
Nabucco gas for over 16 years (see Figure 7). The 1,760km oil pipeline between Baku, the 
















who  strongly  supports  Turkey’s  full  EU membership,  and  for many  other  reasons  in 
addition to energy. 
 









One of  the main reasons  for opposition  to Turkey’s EU membership  is  the fear  that  this 
would lead to a massive influx of Turks into the Union. The same scare tactic was used to 
oppose Spain’s membership, particularly  in France.  It proved  to be unfounded.  Just as 
Spaniards did not migrate en masse to European countries after  joining the EU  in 1986 –
they began to return to their own country before then when membership was in sight– so 
something  similar  is  already  happening  in  Turkey.  The  number  of  Turks  who  have 
returned home from Germany, the EU country with by far the largest Turkish community 
(an estimated 3.5 million people of Turkish origin live there), now exceeds the number of 





Turkey  does  have  a  very  large  population  (currently  only  some  6  million  less  than 
Germany’s  81  million),  but  its  demographics  are  improving.  The  annual  population 
growth rate dropped from 1.7% in 1990‐95 to a projected 1.1% in 2010‐15, as a result of a 














While  Turkey, with NATO’s  second‐largest  standing  army  after  the US  and  an  early 
member  of  the  Alliance  (in  1952)  vetoes  any  attempt  at  allowing  the  Greek  Cypriot 
authorities  to  access  classified  NATO  documents,  Cyprus  (not  a  member  of  NATO) 
blocks  Turkish  participation  in  the  EU’s  defence  bodies.  Turkey  has  no  access  to  EU 
documents relating  to military missions  (even  those  in which  it participates), and  is not 
even allowed as an observer in relevant decision‐making processes. It is the only NATO 
member not to have signed a security agreement with the EU. However, these obstacles to 












proved  to be of a  temporary nature as  the 1998 agreement between  the UK and France, 











eligible  for ESDP operations  that use NATO assets. Turkey strictly  interprets  the North 
Atlantic Council decision  of  2002  and blocks  the participation  of Cyprus  in NATO‐EU 




Turkey’s contribution  to  the ESDP surpasses  that of several EU member states and  it  is 
the most active participant in ESDP missions among third countries. Turkey is the second‐
largest  troop  contributor  to  Operation  Althea  in  Bosnia‐Herzegovina,  despite  the 
decision‐making body –the European Defence Agency (EDA)– being completely off‐limits 





as  Spain,  and  is  the  only Muslim  country  to participate  in  the NATO‐led mission  (see 
Figure 8). 
 





















Since  the end of  the Cold War, during which Turkey very much did  the bidding of  the 
US, and particularly since the launch of Turkey’s new ‘zero problem’ foreign policy under 
Ahmet  Davutoglu,  who  became  Foreign  Minister  in  May  2009  (see  the  next  section), 





Resolving  the  seemingly  intractable problems of Cyprus –the  issue of direct  trade with 
the internationally‐unrecognised Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and reunification 
of the island (not in itself a sine qua non for Turkey’s entry into the EU)– is the key to the 
whole process of Turkish‐EU accession and hence  to  the  institutional problems between 
NATO  and  the  EU.  But  positions  are  very  entrenched,  and  the  Cyprus  issue  is  a 





Unsurprisingly, Ankara’s foreign policy  is more assertive and  increasingly  looks toward 






















to develop good  relations with all of Turkey’s neighbours  (see Figure 9) and  countries 
beyond, are clearly positive: mending  fences with Syria  (the old risk of war over  issues 
such as Syria’s backing of the PKK terrorist group during the 1990s has given way to visa‐
free  travel);  signing  a  landmark  deal with Armenia  to  open  the  shared  border  (yet  to 
happen)  closed by Ankara  since 1993  in  support of  its ally Azerbaijan  (in  conflict with 
Armenia over Nagorno‐Karabakh); hosting talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan; and 
liaising with  Sunni militants  in  Iraq.  Relations with Georgia  and Greece  have  greatly 
improved,  and Russia has become Turkey’s  leading  trading partner  and one of  its  top 
suppliers  of  tourists.  A  Turk,  Ekmeleddin  Ihsanoglu,  won  the  first  democratically‐
contested election to lead the 57‐member Organisation of the Islamic Conference. 
 
Turkey  is  becoming  an  influential  actor with  considerable  ‘soft  power’  in  the Western 
Balkans and the Middle East. It is shaping up to be a constructive actor in the region. This 
can only benefit European security in the broadest sense and enhances Turkish claims for 







Nonetheless, European capitals and Washington  fret over  two policies  in particular:  (1) 
the standoff with Israel (which for long saw Turkey as its only Muslim ally), following the 







Turkey voted  against  the UN  Security Council’s  additional  sanctions on  Iran,  after  the 
international  community  ignored  the  Turkish‐Brazilian‐Iranian  transfer  part  of  Iran’s 
stockpile  of  uranium  to  Turkey.  Prime  Minister  Erdogan  may  have  been  naïve  in 
believing  Tehran  had  good  intentions,  but  had  his  confidence‐building  measure  won 
wider support,  it could have  led  to broader negotiations and a comprehensive solution. 
Moreover,  Erdogan  kept  the  US  President,  Barack  Obama,  informed  and  did  not  go 
behind his  back. According  to Hugh Pope,  the Turkey/Cyprus project Director  for  the 
International Crisis Group, Ankara is ‘profoundly opposed to nuclear proliferation in the 
Middle  East,  but  it  believes  that  proliferation  is  only  likely  to  be  prevented  through 
persuasion,  not  threats’.  Turkey’s  engagement  with  Iran  and  other  hard‐line  states  is 
based on a wish  to modify  these  states’ behaviour, not on  a desire  to  ally with  them.9 
After all, Washington has been stuck  in a standoff with Tehran  for more  than 30 years. 
Turkey’s approach, however, was undermined by  the haste with which Prime Minister 
Erdogan  welcomed  the  controversial  re‐election  of  Iranian  President  Mahmoud 





that  the  blend  of  electoral  populism,  the  resurgent Kurdish  issue  and  embroilment  in 
assorted  conflicts  in  the Middle East  and  the  southern Caucasus will make Ankara  an 
awkward  partner.  The  robustness  of  the  EU  anchor  therefore  remains  critical.’10  The 
benefits of Turkey’s foreign policy, with the country in the EU, however, would outweigh 
the  disadvantages.  In  the  words  of  a  report  by  the  Transatlantic  Academy,  Turkey’s 






The  Lisbon  Treaty  appeared  to  offer  a way  out  of  the  stalemate  over  the  direct  trade 
regulation,  by  granting  the European  Parliament  (EP)  a  voice  in  the  thorny  issue. But 
hopes were dashed when  the EP’s  legal affairs committee questioned  the  legal basis on 
which  the  European Commission  had  proposed  direct  trade  between  the  EU  and  the 
internationally‐unrecognised Turkish Republic  of Northern Cyprus  (TRNC). Yet  again, 
Cyprus was vindicated. Had the EP decided that the regulation was an international trade 















10). There  is no direct  linkage between  the  two  issues, but  if  the direct  trade  issue was 
resolved, which would enable talks to start on many chapters after Ankara complied with 







Ban Ki‐moon,  the UN Secretary General,  fired a shot across  the bows of  the Greek‐ and 
Turkish‐Cypriot  leaders  last November when he warned them  in a report that a  ‘critical 






recognised  country  or  consolidate  itself  as  the  82nd province  of Turkey, which  is what 







the country, albeit  in  fits and starts, which  is being closely watched  in  the Middle East. 
Were  Turkey  to  join  the  EU,  the  country  would  be  consolidated  as  a  beacon  for  the 
spreading  of  liberal  ideas  and  practices  in  its  neighbourhood.  It  would  show  that 
democracy and the Islamic faith are compatible. This would be particularly important in 







Just  as  the  EU’s  soft  power  –defined  by  Joseph Nye,  the  inventor  of  the  term,  as  the 
‘ability to shape the preferences of others’–  is credited with transforming eight formerly 
communist  Eastern  and Central  European  countries  into  democracies  and  free‐market 





its military  regime  of  1980‐82,  the  combined  value  of  its  annual  exports  of  goods  and 
services was not even one‐tenth of  today’s US$100 billion, broadcast media consisted of 




York  in 1986, as opposed  to  today’s more  than 20  flights a week  to  the US. During  this 
period Turkey has created a sizeable middle class. Take just one indicator and compare it 






















Middle East  0.73  69.4  74.7  9,418 
Arab League  0.70  68.5  69.6  8,103 
Iran  0.78  71.2  82.3  10,955 
Turkey  0.81  71.7  88.7  12,955 
OECD (except Turkey)  0.94  77.8  99.0  33,755 
Notes: as of 2007, the Arab League had 22 members and the OECD included 30 of the world’s most industrialised countries. 






























Middle East  5.1  5.6  2.9  ‐0.3 
Arab League  5.4  6.1  2.8  ‐0.6 
Iran  6.0  6.0  1.8  ‐0.8 
Turkey  3.0  3.0  4.4  0.1 
OECD (except Turkey)  1.4  1.1  6.8  1.2 
Note: for the country groupings, see Figure 11. 




The  proliferation  of  private  wealth  in  Turkey,  albeit  with  a  very  skewed  income 
distribution,  coupled with  the greater degree  of democracy,  is  creating  a more vibrant 
civil  society, which  is  increasingly  admired  in  the Middle  East,  except  among  Islamic 
fundamentalists and political elites in the authoritarian regimes. The Ankara bureau of Al 
Jazeera, the Arabic‐language TV network, is second only to its Washington bureau among 
the  non‐Arab  offices  in  the  number  of  stories  filed,  be  they  about  politics  or  football. 
Popular Turkish TV  shows  enjoy  a big  following  in Egypt,  Iran  and  Syria, despite  the 
language barrier. Turkish  television  is a bridge between  the Arab world and a Western 
way of life, as depicted in Turkey’s secular society. A public opinion survey showed that 
61%  of  respondents  from  seven Arab  countries  saw  Turkey  as  a model  for  the Arab 
world.15 
 
The  Turkish  development  agency  TIKA  channels  a  significant  amount  of money  into 
countries,  many  of  them  in  the  region.  Some  of  these  funds  go  to  good‐governance 
programmes and to help empower women. Turkish NGOs are also engaged in projects in 
neighbouring  countries  promoting  the  dissemination  of  democratic  values  and 
entrepreneurship. 
 
Tourism  is  another  area  attracting  Turkey’s  neighbours  and  enabling  them  to  see  for 
themselves the changes in the country. 
 
Halkan  Altinay,  who  heads  the  Open  Society  Institute  in  Istanbul,  part  of  the  Soros 
Foundations  Network,  which  is  particularly  active  in  promoting  civil  society,  likens 

















The golden period of  reforms by  the AKP was between 2002 and 2005,  since when  the 
pace  has  slowed  down  notably,  though  not  just  because  of  the  blocking  of  so  many 
chapters.  Resistance  from  the  secular  establishment,  particularly  entrenched  in  the 
military,  the  judiciary  and  parts  of  the  media,  has  also  been  a  major  obstacle  and 












said  the number  of  immigrants  coming  into  the UK  from non‐EU  countries  should  be 
sharply reduced. This just sends out a confusing message. 
 
A  confidence‐building  measure  would  be  to  invite  the  Turkish  President  or  Prime 




Foreign  Secretary  between  2001  and  2006,  pointed  out,  ‘Europe’s  strategic  future with 
Turkey is now hostage to negotiations over Cyprus’.18 Straw said there were still serious 
concerns about corruption and inadequate judicial systems in Bulgaria and Rumania, but, 












Turkey’s sheer size, with a population of 75 million, does make  it a difficult  fit  into  the 
EU. Perhaps the time has come to face up to the question of complete free movement of 
people and tell Ankara this would not happen for years, if at all, even after Turkey joined. 
However,  the  country  would  enjoy  many  other  advantages  of  EU  membership.  It  is 
possible  that  Ankara  would  accept  this  in  return  for  greater  visa  facilities  now.  It  is 
absurd that citizens of Serbia, Albania and Bosnia‐Herzegovina all enjoy visa‐free travel 
to Europe, while Turkish businessmen  are often denied visas  to  attend  trade  fairs  and 
students cannot  study abroad. Turkish entrepreneurs  in Europe already  run €40 billion 
worth of businesses, and employ around half a million people. 
 
The  EU‐Turkey  Customs  Union  is  an  uneven  relationship  and  needs  to  be  better 
balanced. It allows EU business people to travel to Turkey freely, while enabling Turkish 
processed  goods  to  enter  the  EU,  but  Turkish  businessmen  (let  alone  all  citizens)  are 
prevented  by  the  Schengen  visa  requirements  from  travelling  hassle‐free  to  Europe  to 
promote  their  products.  The  Customs  Union  requires  Turkey  to  implement  the  EU’s 
Common External Tariff. As a result, when the EU agrees free‐trade accords with third‐
party  countries,  Turkey  has  to  implement  the  terms,  but  third‐party  countries  are  not 
obliged to open their markets to Turkey. 
 
A  re‐engagement  with  Turkey  might  help  galvanise  a  credible  and  electable  social‐
democratic  alternative  to  the  AKP  in  the  2011  elections.  The  euro‐sceptic  and  rigidly 
secularist  Republican  People’s  Party  (CHP),  established  by  the  pro‐European  and 
reformist Mustafa Kemal Atatürk,  the  father of modern Turkey,  is a pale shadow of  its 




mark  the 100th anniversary of  the  founding of  the republic. Turkish disillusionment and 













(a) Opened and provisionally closed 
25. Science and research (Austria: 12/VI/) 
 
(b) Opened 
4. Free movement of capital (France: 18/XII/2008) 
6. Company law (Slovenia: 12/VI/2008) 
7. Intellectual property rights (Slovenia: 12/VI/2008) 
10. Info society and media (France: 18/XII/2008) 
12. Food Safety, Veterinary and Phytosanitary Policy (Spain: 30/VI/2010) 
16. Taxation (The Czech Republic: 30/VI/2009) 
18. Statistics (Germany: 26/VI/2007) 
20. Enterprise and industrial policy (Germany: 28/II/2007) 
21. Trans European networks (Portugal: 19/XII/2007) 
28. Consumer and health protection (Portugal: 19/XII/2007) 
32. Financial control (Germany: 26/VI/2007) 
 
(c) Chapters to be negotiated  
2. Free movement of workers 
5. Public procurement 
8. Competition policy 
10. Information society and media 
12. Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy 
15. Energy 
18. Statistics 
19. Social policy and employment 
20. Enterprise and industrial policy 
21. Trans-European networks 
23. Judiciary and fundamental rights 
24. Justice, freedom and security 
25. Science and research 
26. Education and culture 
27. Environment 
28. Consumer and health protection 
31. Foreign, security and defence policy 
32. Financial control 
 
(d) Chapters suspended over Cyprus by the European Council in December 2006 until Turkey 
complies with its obligations under the Additional Protocol 
1. Free movement of goods 
3. Right of establishment and freedom to provide services 
9. Financial services 
11. Agricultural and rural affairs 
13. Fisheries 
14. Transport policy 
29. Customs Union 
30. External relations 
 
(e) Chapters opposed by France 
11. Agricultural and rural affairs 
17. Economic and monetary policy 
22. Regional policy and coordination of structural funds 
33. Financial and budgetary provisions 
34. Institutions 
 
(f) Chapters opposed by Cyprus 






23. Judiciary and fundamental rights 
24. Justice, freedom and security 
26. Education and culture 
31. Foreign, security and defence policy 
 
Appendix 2. Timeline: The Long and Winding Road to EU Accession 
February 18 1952 
Turkey becomes a full member of Nato. 
September 20 1959 
Turkey applies to the European Economic Community (EEC) to become an associate member. 
May 27 1960 
The army stages a coup and remains in power until October 1961. It draws up a new constitution and 
establishes a mechanism to intervene in politics, the National Security Council. 
September 12 1963 
Turkey is made an associate member of the EEC. 
July 22 1970 
Turkey signs an agreement foreseeing its eventual full membership of the bloc. 
March 12 1971 
The army hands an ultimatum to Prime Minster Demirel’s government. On April 27 1971 martial law is 
declared in 11 provinces; some leftist and religious political parties are closed down. The state security courts, 
heavily influenced by the military, are created. The direct influence of the military lasted until the October 1973 
elections. 
July 20 1974 
Turkey invades Cyprus by sea and air following the failure of diplomatic efforts to resolve conflicts between 
Turkish and Greek Cypriots. After gaining control over 40% of the island, Turkey unilaterally declares a 
ceasefire. 
February 13 1975 
Turkish Cypriots establish their own state in the north of the island. Later that year Turkey takes control of 
most of the US installations within that territory, except the joint defence base at Incirlik, which it reserves for 
‘Nato tasks alone’. 
1978-79 
The EC suggests that Turkey applies for membership along with Greece. Ankara declines the suggestion. 
September 12 1980 
After months of street fighting between rival left-wing and right-wing factions, a third army coup topples the 
Turkish government. Military rule lasts until November 1983. Relations with the EC are virtually frozen. 
1983 
Northern Cyprus declares its territory as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The state is recognised by 
no one else but mainland Turkey. Parliamentary elections are held in Turkey and military rule is ended. 
Relations with the EC begin to normalise. 
May 1984 
The Council of Europe accepts the participation of Turkish parliamentarians. 
January 26 1987 
Turkey recognises the right of its citizens to file complaints with the European Human Rights Commission. 
April 14 1987 
Turkey applies to the EC for full membership. 
December 18 1989 
The European Commission endorses Turkey’s eligibility for membership, but defers the assessment of its 
application. 
January 1 1996 
A Customs Union between the now-named European Union (EU) and Turkey enters into force for industrial 
goods and processed agricultural products. 
December 13 1997 
At the Luxembourg summit, EU leaders decline to grant candidate status to Turkey. Ankara reacts angrily, 
freezing relations and contacts. 
June 2 1999 
Abdullah Ocalan, the founder of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), who led a violent 15-year campaign for 
independence for Turkey’s 14 million or so Kurds, is convicted by Turkey of treason and separatism and 
sentenced to death (not carried out). 
December 10 1999 





the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States’. 
April 2000 
The composition of the State Security Courts is changed, to exclude members of the military. 
March 2001 
The EU approves the Accession Partnership document, which sets out the political, economic and legislative 
reforms that Turkey has to carry out to fulfil the accession criteria. Cyprus is included as part of the ‘Political 
Dialogue and Political Criteria’. 
March 19 2001 
The Turkish Government publishes the National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis, with a detailed 
explanation of the reforms to fulfil the accession criteria. 
October 3 2001 
The Turkish Grand National Assembly approved 34 amendments to the Constitution, the most ambitious 
overhaul since its entry into force in 1982, in order to meet the Copenhagen political criteria. 
August 3 2002 
The Turkish Parliament passes sweeping reforms, including the abolition of the death penalty and the easing 
of bans on the use of the Kurdish language, to meet some of the EU’s human-rights criteria. 
November 3 2002 
The conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP), which has Islamic roots, wins a general election 
partially on a pledge to drive forward Turkey’s sagging EU bid. 
November 30 2002 
The state of emergency in all remaining provinces of the south-east was lifted. 
December 11 2002 
The Turkish Parliament approves a clutch of constitutional reforms that make it harder to shut down parties 
and easier to prosecute torturers. 
December 12 2002 
The EU summit at Copenhagen decides to accept Cyprus in May 2004, despite faltering talks to reunify the 
island. It proposes a December 2004 review of Turkey’s progress in fulfilling the Copenhagen political criteria 
for EU membership, and if the outcome is positive accession negotiations will be opened ‘without delay’. 
April 2003 
The EU Council approves a revised Accession Partnership, specifying the remaining priority areas for reform. 
In July the Turkish government publishes a revised National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis. 
July 2003 
The seventh reform package reduces the influence of the armed forces via the powerful National Security 
Council. The Council becomes more of an advisory body. 
November 5 2003 
The European Commission released its sixth regular report on Turkey’s progress towards accession. It said 
the government had ‘shown great determination in accelerating the pace of reforms’ but ‘on the ground, 
implementation of the reforms is uneven’. The report warned that Turkey’s hopes of starting formal accession 
talks with the EU could face a ‘serious obstacle’ if no settlement is reached over the divided island of Cyprus 
by May 2004 (when Cyprus joins the EU). 
January 15 2004 
Romano Prodi is the first President of the European Commission to visit Turkey since 1963. 
March 31 2004 
Talks on a revised UN plan for the unification of Cyprus failed to win endorsement from the leaders of the 
island’s Greeks. But the United Nations decided to go ahead anyway and put its plans to a vote in both parts 
of Cyprus on April 24, ahead of the island’s entry into the EU on May 1. 
April 24 2004 
The Greek-Cypriot part of Cyprus entered the EU, but not the Turkish-Cypriot part, after more than three-
quarters of Greek-Cypriots voted against the UN plan to reunite the island. Turkish-Cypriots, in contrast, 
endorsed the plan. Both sides had to accept the reunification plan in order for the whole island to join the EU. 
September 6 2004 
An Independent Commission of Europeans who previously held high positions in public office, including 
Marcelino Oreja, a former Spanish Foreign Minister and EU Commissioner, called for the EU to treat Turkey’s 
case with ‘respect, fairness and consideration’. 
September 13 2004 
Less than a month before the landmark report by the European Commission on Turkey’s progress towards 
meeting the criteria for starting accession talks, Brussels warned Ankara that unless it removed proposals 
before parliament to criminalise adultery it would not meet the minimum criteria required of aspiring members. 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the Turkish Prime Minister, accused the EU of interfering in the country’s internal 
affairs, but withdrew the proposals. 





The Turkish parliament held an emergency session and approved reforms of the penal code including tougher 
sentences for torture and ‘honour killings’. 
October 6, 2004 
The European Commission issues a report recommending that the European Council at its meeting in 
December opens accession negotiations, but with certain conditions. 
December 17, 2004 
EU leaders agree at the Brussels summit to open talks on Turkey's EU accession. The decision, made at a 
summit in Brussels, follows a deal over an EU demand that Turkey recognise Cyprus as an EU member. 
October 3, 2005 
EU membership negotiations officially launched. 
June 2006 
Parliament passes new anti-terror law, which worries the EU. 
December 11, 2006 
The EU partially freezes membership talks because of Ankara’s failure to open its ports and airports to Greek 
Cypriot traffic. 
July 22, 2007 
The AK Party wins the parliamentary elections, which were brought forward to try and end the stand-off 
between secularists and Islamists over the choice of Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül as the next President. His 
candidacy was opposed by the army. 
August 28, 2007 
Abdullah Gül is elected president by the parliament. 
July 30, 2008 
Petition to the constitutional court to have the governing AK Party banned for allegedly undermining the 
secular constitution fails by a narrow margin. 
October 20, 2008 
Trial starts of 86 suspected members of a shadowy ultra-nationalist Ergenekon group, which is accused of 
plotting a series of attacks and provoking a military coup against the government. 
July 9, 2009 
President Abdullah Gül approves legislation giving civilian courts the power to try military personnel for 
threatening national security or involvement in organised crime. 
October 10, 2009 
Turkey and Armenia agree to normalise relations at a meeting in Switzerland, Both parliaments will need to 
ratify the accord. Turkey says opening the shared border will depend on progress on resolving the Nagorno-
Karabakh dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan. 
April 2010 
Parliament begins debating constitutional changes in order to make Turkey more democratic. The opposition 
Republican People’s Party says the AKP is seeking more control over the secular judiciary with some of the 
proposals. 
May 8, 2010 
The Reflecting Group, chaired by the former Spanish Prime Minister Felipe González, presented its report to 
the European Council on the future of the EU 2030. It said the Union ’must honour its commitments with 
regard to the current official candidates, including Turkey, and carry on with the negotiation process.’ 
September 12, 2010 
Amendments to the constitution were approved in a referendum by 58% of voters and rejected by 42%. 
November 9, 2010 
The European Commission’s annual progress report on Turkey’s accession talks was the most positive for a 
number of years, but still pointed out deficiencies in various areas of fundamental rights. 
November 25, 2010 
UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon released a report on the negotiations to reunify Cyprus and warned that a 
‘critical window of opportunity’ to resolve the issue was ‘closing rapidly’. 
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